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Abstract: Ethnobiology has a long tradition of metaphysical debates about the “naturalness,”            
“objectivity”, “reality”, and “universality” of classifications. Especially the work of Brent Berlin has been              
influential in developing a “convergence metaphysics” that explains cross-cultural similarities of           
knowledge systems through shared recognition of objective discontinuities in nature. Despite its            
influence on the development of the field, convergence metaphysics has largely fallen out of favor as                
contemporary ethnobiologists tend to emphasize the locality and diversity of classificatory practices.            
The aim of this article is twofold: First, I provide a historical account of the rise and fall of convergence                    
metaphysics in ethnobiology. I show how convergence metaphysics emerged as an innovative            
theoretical program in the wake of the “cognitive revolution” and the “modern evolutionary synthesis”              
but failed to incorporate both theoretical insights and political concerns that gained prominence in the               
1980s and 1990s. Second, I develop a positive proposal of how to engage with metaphysical issues in                 
ethnobiology. By integrating traditional research on convergence of classifications with more nuanced            
accounts of distinctly local categories, a revamped metaphysics of ethnobiological classification can            
make substantial contributions to debates about ontological difference in anthropology and about the             
relation between applied and theoretical ethnobiology.  
 
Ethnobiology of the 1960s and 1970s was deeply steeped in a metaphysical discourse about              
“discontinuities in nature” (Hunn 1977) and “the structure of nature itself” (Berlin et al. 1966,               
275). For example, Diamond (1966) influentially argued that correspondence between          
ethnotaxa “and species as recognized by European taxonomists reflects the objective reality            
 
of the gaps separating sympatric species.” Bulmer (1970, 1087) suggested that “the hard             
core of lower order groupings in any taxonomy [...] simply has to be ’general’ or ’natural’ and                 
consist of multi-purpose, multi-dimensional units which bear a definite correspondence to           
those applied by the biological scientist.” Berlin (1973, 260) argued that “the objective             
biological discontinuities recognized by primitive man are, for the most part and with             
explainable exceptions identical at some level with those recognized by western science.”            
Dywer (1976, 440) pointed out that “the folk classifier perceives objective discontinuities in             
the natural world” which ground convergence with biological species that are recognized in             
contemporary biology.  
While Berlin’s monograph ​Ethnobiological Classification (1992) provides a synthesis         
of this ambitious theoretical program, metaphysical debates about classification have largely           
vanished from the ethnobiological research literature. In part, this development reflects a            
broader trend towards questions of application in ethnobiology (e.g. Hanazaki et al. 2013,             
Hidayati et al. 2015; Nabhan 2016; Wolverton 2013; ​Wyndham et al. 2011​). Insofar as              
ethnobiologists have become increasingly concerned with issues such as agricultural          
practices, conservation biology, knowledge rights, environmental justice, and indigenous         
self-determination, theoretical debates about classification have lost their status as the           
methodological core of the discipline. However, even current research on classification in            
ethnobiology largely avoids continuing theoretically ambitious and metaphysical projects.         
Much of the recent literature on ethnobiological classification focuses on the generation of             
new data but is remarkably hesitant to use this data for wider theoretical or even explicitly                
metaphysical arguments (for an exception, see Begossi et al. 2008). Finally, metaphysical            
claims about converging knowledge systems are occasionally also rejected more directly by            
arguing that their “over-simplified use of universal principles risks ignoring the very essence             
of diversity itself. Instead, we must give particular attention to the anomalies, the unique              
2 
cultural expressions, and the collisions of dissonant taxonomic structures” (Nabhan 2016,           
27). 
The aim of this theoretical essay is twofold. First, I develop a historical analysis of the                
rise and fall of metaphysical ambitions in ethnobiology. I argue that “convergence            
metaphysics” emerged in the late 1960s as an innovative theoretical program but failed to              
respond to both epistemic and political concerns. On the basis of this historical diagnosis, I               
argue that the failure of convergence metaphysics should not lead to a general rejection of               
metaphysical considerations and I propose a revamped metaphysics of ethnobiological          
classification that incorporates insights from debates about taxonomic pluralism. I conclude           
by arguing that such a revamped metaphysics of ethnobiological classification can provide            
substantial insights both for anthropological debates about ontological difference and for           
integrating applied and theoretical concerns in ethnobiology.  
 
I The Rise and Fall of Convergence Metaphysics in Ethnobiology  
 
I.1 The Emergence of Convergence Metaphysics 
 
Convergence metaphysics in ethnobiology emerged in the late 1960s as an innovative            
program that synthesized cross-cultural studies of folk biological classification with          
theoretical developments of the “cognitive revolution” and the “modern evolutionary          
synthesis”. Despite this complex historical constellation, the basic idea of convergence           
metaphysics can be illustrated with simple examples such as Berlin’s (1992, 9) informal             
experiment of bird classification: “​Museum skins of several species of brightly colored            
Amazonian birds [...] are dumped from a basket in a heap on a table. [...] A student volunteer                  
is called from the class and asked to simply ‘classify’ the collection. The student's efforts               
always result in a series of neatly stacked groups of individual birds, usually lined up in a                 
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row. The piles correspond perfectly to the groupings recognized by scientific ornithologists,            
as well as to those of the Huambisa and Aguaruna Jivaro from whom the specimens were                
collected.” This agreement between untrained students, scientific ornithologists, Huambisa         
and Aguaruna Jivaro is clearly an interesting phenomenon that requires explanation. At this             
point, convergence metaphysicians move from empirical claims about classificatory behavior          
to a metaphysical explanandum: taxonomic convergence can only be explained under the            
assumption of joint recognition of objective discontinuities in nature.  
While the argument is quickly introduced, its influence on the historical development            
of ethnobiology requires a more complex analysis. H​arold Conklin’s unpublished dissertation           
The Relation of Hanunóo Culture to the Plant World (1954) is widely hailed as a watershed                
moment in the development of ethnobiology. Conklin’s work was groundbreaking both in its             
methodological sophistication and its detailed documentation of “more than 1800 mutually           
exclusive folk taxa, while botanists divide the same flora - in terms of species - into less than                  
1300 taxa” (1962, 12). Conklin’s study did not only exemplify a new “ethnoscientific” program              
(e.g. Frake 1962; Sturtevant 1964; Werner 1966) in anthropology but also provided a model              
for countless studies of ethnobiological classification that followed in the 1960s and 1970s.             
One may be tempted to argue that this influx of new data was already sufficient to push the                  
young field of ethnobiology towards convergence metaphysics: as researchers returned from           
different parts of the world with stunningly similar accounts of taxonomic systems, their             
metaphysical explanation in terms of objective discontinuities in nature was an inevitable            
consequence.  
Indeed, Berlin’s (1992, 13) recollection of encountering Conklin’s work illustrates this           
assumption: “One October morning, after having spent several months of ethnobiological           
fieldwork in Chiapas, [...] I was pleasantly surprised to receive in the mail a dog-eared               
xeroxed copy of ‘The Relation of Hanunóo Culture to the Plant World’”. What impressed              
Berlin was not only Conklin’s detailed documentation of Hanunóo classifications but rather            
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the similarity between the taxa that are recognized by Hanunóo in the Philippines and Tzeltal               
in Chiapas: “I was suddenly confronted with an unlikely problem in culture history:             
transpacific ethnobotanical contact between the Philippines and southern Mexico, direction          
of transmission not yet determinable!​” (Berlin 1992, 13, emphasis in original). Of course,             
Berlin did not actually assume that there was transpacific contact between Hanunóo and             
Tzeltal but rather concluded that they employ similar taxonomies because they recognize the             
same objective biological structures.  
However, it would be inadequate to explain the rise of convergence metaphysics            
solely as a reaction to novel data. In fact, much of the early ethnoscientific literature insisted                
on cross-cultural relativity rather than convergence. Sturtevant’s 1964 review of the           
ethnoscientific literature illustrates this point by arguing that “work in this field [ethnobiology]             
is partially relevant, in that it has frequently been realized (although also too often ignored)               
that the species and genus categorizations of other cultures normally do not coincide with              
those of Western science” (1964, 120). Even Berlin’s earliest writings emphasized diversity            
rather than similarity. In “Folk Taxonomies and Biological Classification”, Berlin et al. (1966)             
found that only 34 percent of Tzeltal plant names corresponded to a botanical species and               
most of them were assumed to be influenced by western taxonomies through association             
“with Hispanic culture”. Instead of proposing a convergence metaphysics, Berlin et al. (1966)             
largely interpreted Tzeltal plant classification in terms of unique cultural uses by pointing out              
the correlation between classificatory detail and cultural significance of ethnotaxa. 
What then led to the widespread adoption of convergence metaphysics in works such             
as Diamond (1966), Berlin et al. (1973), Hunn (1975), and Brown (1977)? Why did Berlin               
(1973, 7) passionately denounce what he called the “relativistic position I once espoused             
myself”? In addition to the availability of new cross-cultural data, the emergence of             
convergence metaphysics has to be understood through its embedding in two powerful            
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theoretical developments: the search for universal structures in the “cognitive revolution” and            
the species realism of the “modern evolutionary synthesis”. 
The crucial importance of linguistics and cognitive psychology for the development of            
ethnobiology is widely recognized in the literature (see D’Ambrosio 2014; Hunn 2007; Sobra             
and Albuquerque 2016) and the prominence of convergence metaphysics cannot be           
understood independently of debates about universal cognitive structures that dominated the           
early days of the cognitive revolution. Universalism constituted a core theme in founding             
documents of the cognitive revolution from Miller’s (1956) hypothesis of a general capacity of              
the human short-term memory to Chomsky’s (1965) universal grammar. Anthropologists who           
joined this young movement in the context of an “ethnoscientific” program often aimed for              
analogous insights about general rules and structures below the “surface” of cultural            
diversity. For example, Casagrande (1963, 280) argued that anthropologists and linguists           
share “the task of uncovering the common pattern, or the universal design, that underlies the               
exuberant variety of the particular configurations that we call cultures and languages.”            
Convergence metaphysics would have been hardly possible without these universalistic          
ambitions that ethnobiologists shared with their peers in linguistics and psychology: instead            
of emphasizing the diversity of perspectives on the biological world, cognitive ethnobiology            
aimed at identifying underlying structures of convergence in classificatory systems.  
While the influence of the cognitive revolution on the development of ethnobiology is             
widely acknowledged, the emergence of convergence metaphysics is equally indebted to a            
second theoretical development: species realism in the context of the “modern evolutionary            
synthesis”. Evolutionary biology had often been interpreted as challenging realism about           
biological taxa with authors like Burma (1949) arguing that continuous lines of descent can              
only be divided arbitrarily and therefore expose species as “a mental construct without             
objective existence” (1949, 369). Mayr’s (1949) realist response to Burma is illuminating in             
several ways: First, his observation of a “striking discontinuity between local populations”            
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(1949, 371) became the core evidence for the compatibility of population biology and species              
realism that also found advocates in other influential proponents of the modern synthesis like              
Dobzhansky (1963) and Simpson (1951). As Mayr put it in a later formulation of his realist                
paradigm: “One of the minor tragedies in the history of biology has been the assumption [...]                
that constancy and clear definition of species are strictly correlated and that one must either               
believe in evolution (the 'inconstancy' of species) and then have to deny the existence of               
species except as purely subjective, arbitrary figments of the imagination or, as most early              
naturalists have done, believe in the sharp delimitation of species but think that this              
necessitates denying evolution” (1957, 2). 
Second, Mayr’s influential arguments for species realism often relied on casual           
remarks about the convergence of folk classifications and modern biology. In his 1949             
exchange with Burma, for example, Mayr writes that the “primitive Papuan of the mountains              
of New Guinea recognizes as species exactly the same natural units that are called species               
by the museum ornithologist” (1949, 371). In a later publication, Mayr (1963,17) remarks: “I              
spent several months with a tribe of superb woodsmen and hunters in the Arfak Mountains of                
New Guinea. They had 136 different vernacular names for the 137 species of birds that               
occurred in the area, confusing only two species. It is not pure coincidence that these               
primitive woodsmen arrive at the same conclusion as the museum taxonomists, but an             
indication that both groups of observers deal with the same non-arbitrary discontinuities of             
nature”. While many of these comments are made ​en passant​, Mayr’s influence on             
ethnobiology is directly acknowledged in Diamond’s classical argument that “one-to-one          
correspondence [between Fore and scientific bird taxa] strikingly illustrates the objective           
reality of the species” (1966, 151). In fact, Diamond’s publication was largely framed as a               
replication of Mayr’s findings. And even in Berlin’s 1992 book ​Ethnobiological Classification,            
Mayr still stands out as the scientific authority for a species realism that acknowledges              
"discrete, discontinuous chunks of biological reality" (Berlin 1992, 81). 
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To sum up, the rise of convergence metaphysics in ethnobiology in the late 1960s              
was the result of at least three interacting factors: (1) new data about folk classification of                
unprecedented detail as pioneered by Conklin (1954); (2) the emphasis of universal            
cognitive structures in the early waves of the cognitive revolution such as Miller (1956) and               
Chomsky (1965); (3) the consolidation of species realism in the writings of Mayr (e.g. 1949,               
1963) and other proponents of the modern synthesis. Building on these developments,            
convergence metaphysics in ethnobiology established itself as a highly productive research           
program that employed cutting edge methods from different disciplines and captured the            
zeitgeist ​of both the human and the life sciences. Through the 1970s, ethnobiologists used              
these methods to generate innovative research such as Berlin et al.’s (1973) general             
principles, Hunn’s (1975) measure of degrees of classificatory correspondence, and Brown’s           
(1977) arguments for universal “life forms”. The original character of this research not only              
contributed to the institutionalization of ethnobiology as a field with a distinct identity but also               
to making ethnobiology a “major powerhouse of [...] cultural-anthropological theory and           
method” (Anderson 2011, 6). 
 
I.2 Where Things Went Wrong 
 
The rapid rise of convergence metaphysics through the 1970s was followed by an almost              
equally rapid decline. Various critical voices appeared in the 1980s and by the time Berlin               
published his synthesizing ​Ethnobiological Classification ​(1992) ​much of the field had           
already given up on his strong metaphysical program. This is not to say that all aspects of                 
Berlin’s framework have fallen out of favor. On the contrary, Berlin’s research has set              
methodological standards of continuing relevance for research on ethnobiological         
classification (e.g. Cardoso et al. 2010; Lampman 2007; Ferreira et al. 2009; Zariquiey 2014)              
and some of his theoretical assumptions about taxonomic structures have been widely            
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accepted (e.g. Alves et al 2016; Ellen 2006, 6-8; Hunn and Brown 2011). In contrast, Berlin’s                
metaphysical picture of “objective discontinuities in nature” that ground cross-cultural          
convergence in classifications has largely vanished from the research literature.  
In this section, I want to argue that the quick fall of convergence metaphysics has to                
be understood through two parallel developments that exploited different weaknesses. First,           
convergence metaphysics relied on the combination of rather different theoretical          
frameworks: the assumption of universal cognitive structures in the human sciences and            
species realism in the biological sciences. This combination became increasingly unstable           
as several researchers used assumptions about universal cognitive structures to explain           
cross-cultural convergence without any reference to the traditional species realism. Second,           
the emphasis of convergence became increasingly controversial as cognitive ethnobiology          
became challenged by projects that focused on local classifications and local ecological            
knowledge of indigenous communities. These two parallel developments left convergence          
metaphysics with a quickly dwindling number of allies. While cognitively oriented researchers            
abandoned metaphysical claims about species realism in favor of a more austere cognitive             
science of classification, large parts of the ethnobiology community shifted emphasis from            
cross-cultural convergence to the diversity of “local” and “traditional ecological knowledge”. 
 
The Crumbling Alliance Between Cognitive Universalism and Biological Realism:         
Convergence metaphysicians commonly start with observations about cross-cultural        
similarities in classifications and argue that the these similarities can only be explained in              
terms of joint recognition of objective discontinuities in nature. While the cognitive sciences             
turned out to be a reliable ally in making the case for cross-cultural convergence, it became                
increasingly clear in the 1980s that a consequent cognitivism can provide explanations of             
convergence that actually compete with traditional species realism. To put it terms of a              
somewhat simplified slogan: ​converging classifications can be the result of shared cognitive            
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biases rather than shared recognition of objective joints in nature. ​For example, a taxon such               
as “tree” is found in many different cultures but one may argue that this tells us much more                  
about our evolved perceptual systems than about “objective joints in nature”. As Atran put it               
as early as 1981: “How comes it that cultures belonging to such widely separated times and                
places invariably produce similar basic groupings? The only conceivable answer is that they             
employ identical cognitive processing over similar empirical domains” (64). 
Atran’s work since the 1980s clearly illustrates the tensions between traditional           
convergence metaphysics and research that was increasing entangled with cognitive          
psychology of classifications and mental representations. Atran’s ​Cognitive Foundations of          
Natural History (1990) develops a sophisticated cognitivist alternative to convergence          
metaphysics by proposing an account of phenomenally coherent folk kinds that do not have              
to converge on scientific kinds. As Atran argues, categories such as "bug", "butterfly",             
"hawk", "thistle", "tree", or “sparrow” commonly converge between folk-taxonomies even if           
they do not correspond to any categories in scientific taxonomies. In explicit contrast with              
Berlin’s insistence that “in any local flora or fauna a single pattern stands out from the rest”                 
(1992, 9), Atran argued that different patterns will stand out for folk biologists and for               
scientists who classify populations on the basis of phylogenetic relations.  
In an important sense, Atran’s arguments did not only turn the cognitivist orientation             
but also the insights of the modern evolutionary synthesis against convergence metaphysics.            
Insofar as contemporary scientific taxonomies reflect phylogenetic relations rather than          
morphological similarities, they will often lead to diverging taxonomic distinctions. As Atran            
points out in his review of Berlin’s ​Ethnobiological Classification, ​convergence can therefore            
be a symptom of taxonomies that do not adhere to phylogenetic standards: “Should the              
correlation between the cultural consensus on folk taxonomy and classical taxonomy prove            
stronger [than with phylogenetic taxa], then continued preference for classical taxonomy may            
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reflect the continuing hold of common sense on science rather than a strictly ‘objective’              
correspondence” (Atran 1993, 197).  
 
The Epistemic and Political Importance of Local Knowledge: ​Atran’s critique is remarkable            
because of its internal character that turned assumptions about universal cognitive           
processing and about biological taxonomy against the program of convergence metaphysics.           
While this critique exposed internal tensions within cognitive ethnobiology, a largely parallel            
development in ethnobiology challenged the priority of cognitive considerations and its focus            
on cross-cultural convergence.  
Hunn’s article on “the utilitarian factor in folk biological classification” (1982) provides            
an early and highly influential expression of doubts about the dominance of cognitive             
perspectives in ethnobiology. Partly reflecting on his own writings from the 1970s, Hunn             
argued that “we have unduly stressed the disinterested intellectualism of our informants, and             
as a consequence have taken for granted their practical wisdom. Pragmatism is no sin”              
(1982, 831). By reconsidering utilitarian explanations, Hunn proposed a model of taxonomic            
convergences that emphasized questions of practical value and therefore differed not only            
from Berlin’s universally recognized natural kinds but also from Atran’s cognitively unified            
folk taxa.  
While the cognitive and cultural foundations of life form taxa such as “tree” became              
the subject of a specialized controversy within ethnobiology (e.g. Hunn 1987; Atran 1987),             
Hunn’s comments also captured a more general discontent (see also Dougherty 1978; Ellen             
1986; Silitoe 1980) with the state of cognitive ethnobiology that eventually contributed to the              
widespread adoption of novel frameworks such as “traditional ecological knowledge” (TEK)           
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. Johannes 1989; Berkes et al. 1995). Of course, it had                  
always been recognized that cross-cultural similarities between ethnobiological knowledge         
had to be understood on the background of cultural diversity and local expertise about              
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environments. For convergence metaphysicians, however, the most important task of          
ethnobiology was to figure out what knowledge systems had in common and not to analyze               
in what ways they were unique. TEK shifted priorities in a rather dramatic way by               
emphasizing the importance of distinctly local forms of knowledge about specific           
environments. Given this reconsideration of “utilitarian factors” and local knowledge, a           
growing number of ethnobiologists also stressed the importance of phenomena that were            
neglected in convergence metaphysics as peripheral exceptions and “special purpose taxa”. 
While the increased recognition of TEK shifted attention to local forms of knowledge,             
many of these more specific challenges overlapped with a more general hostility towards             
universalist projects in cultural anthropology. Partly motivated by Geertz’ (1973, 11) famous            
critique of the ethnoscientific tradition, ethnobiology of the late 20th century increasingly            
found itself in heated controversies about postmodernism and poststructuralism in          
anthropology (see Anderson 2000; Hunn 2007). Much of this literature did not only challenge              
the epistemological foundations but also the political implications of projects that focused on             
convergence and complementarity. For example, Nadasdy (1999, 7) influentially argued that           
integration projects will often lead to a marginalization of knowledge that does not meet the               
criteria of scientists and resource managers: “whole aspects of aboriginal peoples' reality fall             
outside the established categories of scientific resource management”.  
In the context of ethnobiological classification, the most bitter controversies          
developed around Berlin’s ethnopharmacological research in the late 1990s and the           
formation of the “International Cooperative Biodiversity Group“ in Chiapas. Following the           
general program of convergence metaphysics, Berlin assumed that Maya knowledge about           
pharmacological properties of plants would turn out to be largely commensurable with            
western science and could be used for mutual benefit (Berlin and Berlin 1996).             
Anthropologists like Nigh (2000, 452) did not only challenge the theoretical assumptions of             
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convergence metaphysics but rather accused Berlin’s program of doing “violence to           
indigenous meanings of nature, medicine, and property.”  
 
One may wonder whether any of the mentioned challenges is sufficient for a rejection of the                
entire program of convergence metaphysics. Surely, there seems to be a lot of room for               
compromise. For example, one could acknowledge Atran’s (1990) points about the           
phenomenal basis of folk taxa such as “tree” while pointing out that other folk taxa such as                 
“jaguar” continue to converge on scientific taxa. Surely, one could continue to treat             
cross-cultural convergence as an important issue in ethnobiology without denying the           
importance of cross-cultural divergence and without marginalizing distinctly local forms of           
TEK. And indeed, there were serious and methodologically sophisticated attempts to find a             
compromise. Ellen (1986), for example, proposed a model for the integration of cognitive and              
social factors in ethnobiological classification and concluded that “at once the debate            
between universalists and relativists is seen as the caricature it inevitably must be; an              
entirely false opposition sustained through ideological mystification and polemic“ (1986, 93).  
Berlin (1992), however, was not having any of it. Responding to Ellen’s suggestion             
that the contrast between universalists and relativists is an unhelpful caricature, Berlin            
insisted that “the debate, both in anthropology in general and ethnobiology in particular, is              
hardly a caricature” (1992, 11). While universalists followed “biological systematists who hold            
that biological species are real,” (1992, 12) Berlin argued that the relativist tradition in              
anthropology had become lost in postmodernist fashions. For Berlin, there remained a            
choice between two incompatible options: species are either recognized or rejected as            
objective natural kinds. Any attempt to come up with a compromise is going to blur this                
contrast between two irreconcilable metaphysical perspectives. Interestingly, the same         
attitude is found simultaneously in the writings of Mary Douglas as one of the main               
proponents of the relativist tradition. Discussing the contrast between ethnoscientific and           
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constructionist approaches in anthropology, Douglas warned about an “eclectic muddle” and           
continued by arguing that “nature cannot provide the basis of classification systems; there             
are no natural kinds, or if there are, biological species cannot be included” (1993, 161; see                
also Ellen 2006, 2). 
 
II Rethinking Metaphysics of Ethnobiological Classification 
 
The rise and fall of convergence metaphysics in the second half of the 20th century is not                 
merely a topic of historical interest but continues to have a profound impact on the state of                 
ethnobiological research. Given the increasingly ideological stalemate towards the end of the            
20th century, it is not surprising that ethnobiologists have become largely disengaged with             
the entire debate about the metaphysics of ethnobiological classification. As Zent (2009, 27)             
remarks: The debate about “intellectualist against utilitarian explanations of the prolific           
classification abilities of folk peoples [...] has faded from active academic discussions without             
any clear resolution.” Zent’s observation is not only apt for the internal debates in              
ethnobiology but also affects their wider position in contemporary anthropology. While           
controversies about the metaphysics of ethnobiological classification were carried out in           
journals of general anthropology such as the ​American Anthropologist (Berlin et al 1973;             
Brown 1977; Hunn 1982) and ​Current Anthropology ​(Brown 1985; Atran 1993; Nigh 2002),             
the topic has largely disappeared from active discussion.  
The aim of the following sections is two-fold. First, I argue that the general demise of                
metaphysical debates about ethnobiological classification reflects a number of missed          
opportunities of connecting ethnobiology with the more recent development of debates about            
taxonomies and ontologies. The problem is not metaphysics of ethnobiological classification           
in general. The problem is that the metaphysical debates became stuck in a polemic of               
universalism vs. relativism that isolated it from theoretical developments in other fields.            
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Second, I argue that a revamped metaphysics of ethnobiological classification can provide            
important insights for debates in anthropological theory and for attempts to connect applied             
and theoretical debates in ethnobiology.  
 
II.1 Three Missed Opportunities 
 
While metaphysical debates in ethnobiology became increasingly stagnant in the late 20th            
century, innovative theoretical frameworks were developed in a number of fields from            
biological systematics and philosophy of science to social ontology and anthropological           
theory. In the following, I want to highlight three theoretical developments that have been              
largely missed in the ethnobiological literature and show how their incorporation can lead to              
a nuanced framework beyond controversies between universalism and relativism. 
 
1. Pluralism​: From the perspective of current debates about biological taxonomies, one of             
the most striking features of convergence metaphysics is its uncompromising monism.           
According to Berlin, there is exactly one fundamental and objective way of carving up              
biological diversity at the species level. As he put it in ​Ethnobiological Classification​: “in any               
local flora or fauna a single pattern stands out from the rest” (1992, 9). Although Berlin                
acknowledges the abstract possibility of classifying biological diversity in different ways, he            
quickly adds that “the empirical comparative data between Western scientific and folk            
scientific systems of biological classification, as well as among the folk systems t​hemselves,             
point to a single, preferred ordering that is primary and fundamental in humans’ appreciation              
of nature’s plan” and concludes that “one way is more natural than any other” (Berlin 1992,                
26). 
While this monism reflects classical articulations of species realism by authors like Mayr, it              
strongly contrasts with the pluralist mainstream that has emerged from decades of debate             
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about the “species problem” (e.g. Ereshefsky 2001; Slater 2013; Zachos 2016). Pluralists in             
the species debate often accept metaphysical claims about “discontinuities in nature” but            
emphasize that biological discontinuities come in different dimensions. Kitcher’s (1984)          
classical defense of species pluralism, for example, starts with the observation that            
synchronic and diachronic discontinuities do not always align. For example, morphological           
and phylogenetic classifications of organisms will overlap but often also lead to slightly             
different boundaries of taxa. Furthermore, both synchronic and diachronic perspectives can           
be grounded in different discontinuities. It is not only the case that there are different (e.g.                
morphological or genetics) sets of synchronic properties but also that diachronic classification            
allows the formulation of different species concepts. At what point does a lineage constitute a               
new species? It has become widely acknowledged that traditional answers such as Mayr’s             
“biological species concept” will not always be applicable and that well-known alternatives            
such as Van Valen’s (1977) “ecological species concept” and Cracraft’s (1983) “phylogenetic            
species concept” will be at least occasionally preferable. Of course, the status and extent of               
species pluralism remains debated in the light of an ever-growing number of candidate             
definitions (e.g. Zachos 2016). However, it has become widely accepted that contemporary            
biology uncovers biological discontinuities along related but not always co-extensional          
dimensions. Even if we restrict ourselves to contemporary academic taxonomy, it is therefore             
often not the case that “a single pattern stands out from the rest” and this result needs to be                   
considered by anyone who is interested in biological classification across cultural contexts.  
 
2. ​Realism​: Convergence metaphysicians may suspect that this new pluralist mainstream           
only illustrates the spurious influence of relativism in biological taxonomy. However, this            
would be a mistake. Pluralism is not relativism. On the contrary, much of the pluralist               
literature explicitly endorses realist positions and even employs the same metaphysical           
metaphors of “discontinuities” “patterns”, and “clusters” that dominate the classical literature           
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on ethnobiological classification. Instead of endorsing relativist doctrines, pluralists typically          
embrace the realist idea that taxonomies reflect empirical knowledge about discontinuities in            
nature. However, they add that there are many more discontinuities to be found than              
imagined by traditional monistic doctrines. Given this plurality of discontinuities, any           
classification of the natural world will have to prioritize certain aspects on the basis of the                
interests of a scientific discipline or community.  
What is at stake in many current debates about pluralism is not relativism but rather               
the extent of classificatory flexibility in taxonomies. ​Dupré​’s (1993) “promiscuous realism” has            
taken a radical stance in extending pluralist realism to everyday entities such as “culinary              
kinds” that are distinguished by gastronomic properties even if they are not reflected in              
scientific taxonomies. ​Dupré​’s reasoning is both decisively metaphysical and realist: A           
distinction between culinary kinds is not merely conventional and it is certainly not based on               
a misunderstanding of the natural world. Instead it is based on the recognition of specific               
gastronomic properties. While these properties may not matter in the context of phylogenetic             
classifications of organisms, they are not only relevant for the gastronomic purposes but also              
perfectly real.  
Not everyone assumes that such a promiscuous realism is sufficient for addressing            
classificatory practices in biology. For example, Boyd’s influential account of natural kinds in             
terms of homeostatic properties (e.g. Boyd 1999, see also Wilson et al. 2007) is more               
restrictive than ​Dupré​’s “promiscuous realism” as it assumes a cluster of (e.g. behavioral,             
ecological, genetic, morphological, phylogenetic) properties that are unified through         
homeostatic mechanisms. Property clustering is supposed to capture the observation that           
scientific kinds tend to differ from ​Dupré​’s “gastronomic kinds” in supporting a large variety of               
inferences. Other authors have modified Boyd’s proposal by dropping the requirement of            
homeostatic mechanisms (Slater 2015) or providing a more general account of the causes of              
property clustering (Khalidi 2015). However, none of the mentioned authors wants to turn the              
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clock back to monism or to relativism. Instead, the question is how to understand the scope                
of pluralism in the interplay between empirically discovered structures and contingent           
classificatory interests (Ludwig forthcoming). 
 
3. Norms of Classification​: Pluralism can often be understood as a metaphysical claim about              
a multiplicity of patterns or clusters that undermines the ideal of one privileged system of               
“joints in nature”. At the same time, taxonomic pluralism typically also involves the             
epistemological thesis that successful science requires the recognition of different          
discontinuities for different purposes (e.g. Magnus 2012). In the context of the species             
debate, for example, Kitcher (1984) argues that different scientific projects require different            
species concepts. For example, paleontologists will find the biological species concept           
unsatisfying if there is no data that could verify that the central criterion of interbreeding.               
Other cases do not reflect the epistemic position of the researcher but the characteristics of               
target populations: while a zoologist like Mayr will find that the biological species concept              
often generates plausible taxonomies, the situation is different for a botanist who researches             
plant species that commonly hybridize (Van Valen 1977) or a microbiologist who is             
concerned with organisms that do not even reproduce sexually (O’Malley 2014).  
Much of the classical pluralist literature emphasizes the diversity of epistemic           
interests in biology that require focus on biological discontinuities along different dimensions.            
More recently, however, there has also been increased attention towards more pragmatic            
and social considerations that can guide the choice of taxonomic frameworks (Ludwig            
2016a). For example, consider that phylogenetic species concepts will often split traditional            
taxa into several new species. Groves and Grubb’s ​Ungulate Taxonomy ​(2011) illustrates this             
implication by doubling the number of bovid species. In a recent commentary, Zachos and              
Lovari (2013, 144) do not only mobilize epistemic but also normative conservation concerns             
in their rejection of the phylogenetic species concept in mammalian zoology: “Unwarranted            
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splitting [...] has a number of deleterious consequences because it reduces the population             
size of each species with concomitant legal and regulatory ramifications. Genetic rescue            
may not be allowed (because it would require the crossing of two different acknowledged              
species!), and as a result, the increase in genetic drift and inbreeding and the decrease in                
fitness may not be counteracted.”  
 
While debates about pluralism are occasionally recognized in ethnobiology (e.g. Souza and            
Begossi 2007; Si 2016), the ethnobiological literature has become largely disconnected from            
the development of wider theoretical debates about taxonomies. This situation has led to a              
number of missed opportunities for reconfiguring metaphysical debates about         
ethnobiological classification beyond the traditional contrast between universalism and         
relativism. One of the most persisting problems of convergence metaphysics is that it seems              
to neglect or even marginalize classifications that do not converge on modern biology. If ​“one               
way is more natural than any other” (Berlin 1992, 26), ethnotaxa will either convergence on               
scientific taxa or be defective as representations of the natural world. A pluralist approach,              
however, implies that co​nvergence cannot be a necessary criterion for taking ethnotaxa            
seriously. If taxonomies in contemporary biological systematics do not converge on each            
other, we should also not require that ethnobiological classifications converge towards one            
fundamental taxonomy.  
While pluralism limits reliance on convergence in ethnobiology, its realist components           
also create an important contrast with relativism (Ludwig 2016b). First, recall that most             
pluralists are comfortable with realist appeals to patterns and clusters of properties that             
ground taxonomic practices. Even if two taxonomies fail to converge, they may still both              
allow a realist interpretation in the sense that they simply reflect different empirically             
discovered clusters of properties. Second, realist interpretations of pluralism also provide the            
necessary resources for more nuanced interpretations of complex convergence-divergence         
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patterns. In some cases, communities with different interests will identify different clusters of             
properties in their taxonomies. In other cases, we should expect taxonomic convergence            
because different communities will recognize the same patterns. For example, consider           
convergence between indigenous societies of the Americas as well as contemporary           
biologists in recognizing jaguars as a distinct taxon. Pluralists do not have to deny that               
taxonomic convergence occurs when a population such as jaguars is clearly distinct from all              
other populations along all relevant criteria (Ludwig 2016c). In the case of jaguars, it does               
not matter whether we rely on behavioral, ecological, genetic, morphological, or phylogenetic            
criteria because jaguars are clearly distinct from other Felidae in the Americas along all of               
these criteria. 
Finally, debates about taxonomic pluralism also provide resources for rethinking the           
role of “utilitarian” concerns in ethnobiology. While Hunn influentially argued that practical            
concerns had been treated “almost as an embarrassment” (1982, 831) in ethnobiology, the             
traditional framework of convergence metaphysics provided a clear motivation for this           
attitude: if ethnotaxa are supposed to “carve nature at its joints” in an objective manner, they                
cannot be “distorted” by the idiosyncratic concerns and priorities of local communities.            
Recent debates about the norms of classification in scientific practice amount to direct             
inversion of this situation as it is widely acknowledged that “utilitarian” concerns about             
practical significance and even social implications shape the structure of scientific           
taxonomies. For example, recall the case of the phylogenetic species concept and the             
doubling of bovid species in comparison to more traditional species concepts (Groves and             
Grubb 2011). One may debate whether Zachos and Lovari’s (2013) concerns about            
“taxonomic inflation” and negative conservation effects are legitimate but there is no            
completely neutral position for evaluating the options independently of any concerns.  
 
II.2 Why Metaphysics of Ethnobiological Classification Matters 
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 In the last section, I argued that ethnobiology largely missed the opportunity to engage with               
the development of theoretical debates about taxonomies that followed the decline of the             
classical program of convergence metaphysics since the 1990s. While this creates an            
opportunity for reconsidering the metaphysics of ethnobiological classification, one may          
doubt that there is a lot to gain from such a project. Does ethnobiology really need a                 
metaphysics of classification? Hasn’t ethnobiology moved beyond this issue? In the           
following, I want to sketch two benefits from taking metaphysical issues seriously. First, they              
provide resources for reintroducing ethnobiological classification as a relevant topic for core            
debates in anthropological theory. Second, metaphysics of ethnobiological classification can          
build important bridges between applied and theoretical issues in contemporary          
ethnobiology.  
 
II.2.1 Anthropological Theory and Ontological Difference 
 
The classical debate about convergence metaphysics developed in the center of           
anthropological theory. Not only did the debate unfold in journals such as American             
Anthropologist and ​Current Anthropology but the issues at stake related to the wider             
theoretical questions such as the relation between cognitive and constructivist approaches in            
anthropology. The demise of convergence metaphysics in recent decades has not only            
affected the visibility of theory in ethnobiology but also the visibility of ethnobiology in              
anthropological theory. The most obvious illustration for this development are controversies           
about an “ontological turn” that have captured much of the attention of anthropological             
theory. While large parts of this ontological literature are concerned with broadly            
“ethnobiological” issues of indigenous understanding of animals, plants, and environments          
(e.g. Descola 2013; Kohn 2013; Viveiros de Castro 2014), ethnobiology in the            
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institutionalized sense has played at best a marginal role in the development of these              
debates (however, see Anderson 2015; Ellen 2016, Daly et al. 2016, Rival 2016 for              
engagement from ethnobiological perspectives).  
If research on ethnobiological classification is framed in terms of Berlin’s assumption            
of a “single pattern [that] stands out from the rest” (1992, 9), it directly contradicts recent                
anthropological claims about ontological difference and alterity. While pluralist accounts of           
taxonomies in the sense of section II.1 promise more common ground, my point here is not                
simply that a pluralist metaphysics of ethnobiological classification could be assimilated into            
the “ontological turn”. Instead, research on ethnobiological classification provides a vast           
body of empirical evidence that can lead to novel perspectives on ontological difference.             
Rather than simply repeating core claims from the ontological turn, a revamped metaphysics             
of ethnobiological classification could provide complementary and innovative insights that          
build on more fine-grained forms of divergence in biological ontologies.  
To illustrate this potential of ethnobiological contributions to current debates with at            
least one example, consider the common criticism (e.g. Laidlaw and Heywood 2013, Vigh             
and Sausdal 2014) of the ontological turn as facing a dilemma of either describing or making                
ontological claims. If anthropologists merely describe the ontological commitments of          
different societies, they hardly engage in a novel project that indicates any “turn” whatsoever.              
If anthropologists endorse the ontologies they describe, however, they run into danger of a              
relativist metaphysics “which mistakes multiple representations of the world for multiple           
worlds” (Henare et al. 2007,10). While ontologically oriented anthropologists have proposed           
different responses to this dilemma (e.g. Holbraad and Pedersen 2017), a pluralist            
metaphysics of ethnobiological classification clearly rejects the first horn of merely describing            
ontological assumptions. The whole point of a substantial metaphysical pluralism is to argue             
for the legitimacy of multiple frameworks in engaging with biological diversity.  
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While a pluralist metaphysics of ethnobiological classification clearly moves beyond a           
mere description of classificatory plurality, it also avoids the second horn of an excessive              
relativism of multiple worlds. On the contrary, I have argued that pluralism about biological              
ontologies is commonly integrated with a realist picture. Differences between biological           
ontologies are not suspicious cases of “worldmaking” (Goodman 1978) but are explained            
through the many different patterns and clusters that can be detected in the biological              
domain. A taxonomy that is driven by concerns and values of a local community will often                
identify different patterns than found in the taxonomy of a western zoologist. For example, a               
local indigenous community may classify a group of organisms partly on the basis of              
ecological and even social relations while a scientist may focus on cladistic relations. As a               
result, they recognize different connections between organisms and end up with different            
ontologies. 
Of course, it is far from trivial to generalize such a strategy from fine grained               
ontological differences in ethnobiology (e.g. what counts as a bird?) to more fundamental             
ontological disagreements (e.g. what counts as a person?) that have dominated           
controversies about the ontological turn. However, ethnobiology can provide an interesting           
addition to ontological debates in anthropology through its “bottom-up” strategy that starts            
with often very specific forms of disagreement such as the extension of an individual taxon.               
Tackling methodological problems on this level can provide resources for addressing more            
fundamental forms of divergence in the cross-cultural comparison of ontologies.  
 
II.2.2 Bridging Applied and Theoretical Ethnobiology 
 
Revamping the metaphysics of ethnobiological classification can contribute to a better           
understanding of the relevance of ethnobiology for anthropological theory and especially for            
debates about ontological difference. However, there are also more direct benefits for            
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ethnobiological practice. More specifically, a reconsideration of metaphysical issues can help           
to bridge divisions between applied research that has developed from debates about of             
traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and theoretical issues that have been tackled in            
cognitive and in linguistic traditions of ethnobiology.  
In recent years, it has become common to describe ethnobiology as having entered             
an “age of application” (Wolverton et al. 2014) and many ethnobiologists embrace this             
development as a necessary step for engaging with pressing questions of environmental            
justice and ‘‘the needs of a world coping with rapid ecological change and shifting political               
economies’’ (Wyndham et al. 2011, 124; see also Sillitoe 2006; Wolverton et al. 2014). Many               
ethnobiologists would agree that this emphasis of applied significance should not be played             
off against theoretical issues in ethnobiology and that “there is no fundamental conflict             
between seeing human knowledge as intellectually satisfying and at the same time useful”             
(Hunn 2014, 147; see also Nazarea 1999).  
Despite sophisticated integrative approaches that bring together cognitive        
ethnobiology and TEK (e.g. Zent and Maffie 2009), there can also be little doubt that               
ethnobiological research often remains divided along general methodological lines. The          
emphasis of convergence in the cognitivist tradition and divergence in anthropological           
discussions of alterity provides a straightforward illustration of this persisting danger to            
“fragment an already small body of scholars” (Wolverton 2013, 21).  
A pluralist metaphysics of ethnobiological classification provides resources to build          
bridges between methodological traditions by integrating concerns about locality and          
classification. In a pluralist framework, the local structures of TEK are of crucial relevance for               
ethnobiological classification. In order to understand not only convergence but also           
divergence of taxonomies, ethnobiologists have to engage with patterns and regularities that            
matter for local practices even if they are not of interest for western taxonomists. While this                
research on patterns of local significance has been largely conducted in the context of TEK,               
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it becomes indispensable for making sense of diverging taxonomic decisions of different            
communities. Furthermore, this situation also makes ethnobiological classification relevant         
for research on the applied dimensions of TEK. Insofar as taxonomies are shaped by local               
expertise and priorities, they become expressions and repositories of local knowledge. One            
important source for the analysis of TEK is therefore the analysis of local taxonomies. 
To illustrate this general argument with a brief example, consider Alcántara-Salinas           
et al.’s (2016) recent discussion of Zapotec classifications of birds in San Miguel Tiltepec,              
Oaxaca. The northern Zapotec language of San Miguel Tiltepec does not include an             
ethnotaxon with an extension similar to the phylogenetic group of Aves. Vigini comes closest              
as it includes 109 of the 209 recognized bird species but is restricted by several criteria such                 
as size that exclude both unusually small (e.g. hummingbirds) and large (e.g. hawks) Aves.              
Furthermore, Alcántara-Salinas et al. identify four larger taxonomic groups that partly overlap            
with ​vigini​: (1) ​Artaba rhela refers to nocturnal birds that include “omen birds, which make               
noises during the night believed to forewarn people of impending ill-fortune”           
(Alcántara-Salinas et al 2016, 666). (2) ​Bëa gishi refers to terrestrial birds and those with               
limited flight such as roadrunners and turkeys. (3) Lurshba ​Includes often large and             
predatory birds that fly in the open sky such as vultures and hawks. (4) ​Rshbaa includes                
flying birds that are common in villages and fields and therefore have special relations to               
communities.  
Neither convergence metaphysics nor classificatory relativism seem to provide         
attractive frameworks for engaging with such complex cases of local classificatory systems.            
From the orthodox perspective of convergence metaphysics, higher bird taxa of Zapotec in             
San Miguel Tiltepec simply fail to carve nature at its joints. As such, they seem of only                 
secondary importance compared to other ethnotaxa (e.g. more specific bird generics) that do             
converge on modern biological systematics. From an orthodox relativist perspective, it does            
not make sense to claim that this Zapotec classification fails to carve nature at its joints but it                  
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is also difficult to see how this classificatory system could reflect unique knowledge about the               
structure of a local ecosystem. Instead, it seems that Zapotec classifications of birds in San               
Miguel Tiltepe are just one of countless possible and equally valid constructions of arbitrary              
linguistic divisions between organisms. A pluralist metaphysics of ethnobiological         
classification allows a different perspective that asks how TEK is incorporated in this unique              
classificatory practice. As such, theoretical understanding of Zapotec taxonomies of birds           
requires careful engagement with Zapotec TEK. Furthermore, understanding of Zapotec TEK           
requires careful engagement with these unique taxonomies as expressions and repositories           
of local Zapotec knowledge. Instead of treating applied questions about TEK and theoretical             
questions about classification as separate research programs, a pluralist metaphysics of           
ethnobiological classification can help to integrate them as complementary dimensions of           
ethnobiological research.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In contrast with the dynamic development of applied ethnobiology, debates about the            
metaphysics of ethnobiological classification have been largely in the doldrums since the            
1990s. While there have been innovative contributions by various authors (e.g. Atran and             
Medin 2010; Ellen 2016; Newmaster et al. 2007), the field as a whole has largely retracted                
from metaphysical debates about ethnobiological classification. The aim of this article has            
been to argue that it is both possible and fruitful to revamp these debates with more recent                 
methodological tools that have been developed in the context of taxonomic pluralism.            
Engaging with these general questions is not only epistemically intriguing but can help to              
clarify the contributions of ethnobiology to anthropological debates about ontological          
difference and to strengthen the relations between applied and theoretical research in            
ethnobiology.  
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